From: Erooth Mohamed <ekunhan@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 12:08 PM
Subject: [bangla-vision] US Follows Two Paths on Unrest in Iran and Bahrain... Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood - Issandr El Amrani
U.S. Follows Two Paths on Unrest in Iran and Bahrain
By MARK LANDLER and DAVID E. SANGER
Published: February 15, 2011
WASHINGTON — The Obama administration has responded quite differently to two embattled governments that have beaten protesters and blocked the Internet in recent days to fend off the kind of popular revolt that brought down Egypt's government.
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With Iran — a country under sanctions pursuing a nuclear program that has put it at odds with the West — the administration has all but encouraged protesters to take to the streets. With Bahrain, a strategically important ally across the Persian Gulf from Iran, it has urged its king to address the grievances of his people.
Those two approaches were on vivid display at a news conference on Tuesday.
President Obama accused Iran's leaders of hypocrisy for first encouraging the protests in Egypt, which they described as a continuation of Iran's own revolution, and then cracking down on Iranians who used the pretext to come out on the streets. He then urged protesters to muster "the courage to be able to express their yearning for greater freedoms and a more representative government."
But speaking to other restive countries, including Bahrain, Mr. Obama directed his advice to governments, not protesters, illustrating just how tricky diplomacy in the region has become. He said his administration, in talking to Arab allies, was sending the message that "you have a young, vibrant generation within the Middle East that is looking for greater opportunity; and that if you are governing these countries, you've got to get out ahead of change. You can't be behind the curve."
Mr. Obama's words on Iran, on the other hand, were among the strongest he has ever voiced in encouraging a street revolt, something his administration initially shied away from doing in June 2009, after a disputed presidential election provoked an uprising that was crushed by the government. Later, the administration embraced the protests, but by then the "Green Movement" in Iran had been crushed.
But now, administration officials see an opportunity to expand the fissures in Iranian society and make life more difficult for the mullahs.
"This isn't a regime-change strategy," a senior administration official insisted in recent days. "But it's fair to say that it's exploiting fractures that are already there."
Dealing with other countries in the region is more complicated, however, particularly if they are strategic allies — which was true of Egypt and which prompted criticism that the White House was initially reluctant to put more pressure on such a crucial partner. The same complexities apply to Bahrain, an island state that is home to the United States Navy's Fifth Fleet.
Two protesters have been killed in Bahrain. The authorities also blocked a video channel that was carrying images uploaded by demonstrators in Pearl Square, a traffic circle the protesters have dubbed Bahrain's Tahrir Square.
But on Tuesday, Mr. Obama did not mention the violence in Bahrain and chose to draw his distinction between Egypt's successful uprising and the 2009 crackdown in Iran.
"What's been different is the Iranian government's response, which is to shoot people and beat people and arrest people," he said.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton drew a similar distinction in a speech on Tuesday on Internet freedom. Both Egypt and Iran temporarily shut down the Web and cellphone networks, she said.
In Iran, she said, "after the authorities raided homes, attacked university dorms, made mass arrests, tortured and fired shots into crowds, the protests ended. In Egypt, however, the story ended differently."
In addition to those two countries, Mrs. Clinton listed China, Cuba and Syria as other nations that have censored Facebook and other social networking services.
A senior administration official said the White House had been consistent in calling for all these countries to respond to the demands of their frustrated young people, to allow them to assemble freely and to avoid violence.
But the official said there were deep differences between Iran and Bahrain.
In Iran, the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared that Egypt had followed in the footsteps of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, an "Islamic awakening" he said would result in the "irreparable defeat" of the United States and Israel.
"Frankly, Iran presented this opportunity itself when Khamenei was the only leader in the region who attempted to take credit for Egypt," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly. "Our messaging on this is simply to underscore the hypocrisy."
The official said the administration deplored violence anywhere it occurred, and late on Tuesday the State Department issued a statement saying it was "very concerned" about the two deaths in Bahrain. But the official noted that Bahrain's monarch, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, had responded to the deaths by calling on Tuesday for an investigation and promising to continue a process of political reforms.
King Hamad has been a stalwart American ally in isolating Iran; in fact, in documents released by WikiLeaks, he was quoted by American diplomats as urging the United States to attack Iran's nuclear facilities.
Likewise, in Jordan, another close ally of Washington, the administration official said that King Abdullah II had attempted to stay ahead of popular unrest by dismissing his government and replacing it with officials who have pledged to pass a more fair election law and rights of assembly.
Last weekend, the State Department sent William J. Burns, a senior diplomat and former ambassador, to meet with King Abdullah in Jordan. Mr. Obama's chief counterterrorism adviser, John O. Brennan, has played that role with Yemen, speaking regularly by telephone with its president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, whom he has also urged to avoid violence in responding to protests, the official said.
The administration's response to Yemen, where demonstrators have marched on the presidential palace, is complicated by the fact that the United States conducts counterterrorism operations with Mr. Saleh's government.
Mr. Obama used his news conference to argue that while the revolution in Egypt started quickly, the next act could take far longer. Drawing on studies he had asked for inside the government, he said "the history of successful transitions to democracy have generally been ones in which peaceful protests led to dialogue, led to discussion, led to reform and ultimately led to democracy."
He cited Eastern Europe and the country where he spent much of his youth: Indonesia, "a majority Muslim country that went through some of these similar transitions," which he said did not end up dividing the nation.
Issandr El Amrani February 13, 2011
http://www.arabist.net/blog/2011/2/13/regarding-the-brotherhood.html
Ever since the beginning of the uprising in Egypt, I have been urged to address the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood. I have not done so to make a point: it just was not that important in the phase that just ended, leading to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak. There were more urgent matters at hand, and the alarmism over the Brotherhood we see in many publications was largely silly.
They were not a part of the uprising's beginning, distancing themselves from it initially, and while the Ikhwan youth ended up being a key part of the Tahrir coordinating committee, this is different then the leadership having a key role. Indeed, the Youth and leadership parted at various points over the last week, and I have been told that at one point the Youth refused a direct order from the leadership to move away from tanks (which they, along with others, were blocking by lying underneath them.) Only a few days ago the Ikhwan Youth were telling me that their solidarity with the other youth groups in Tahrir was more important than a leadership they've had problems with fir five years. And, when the MB was given an unprecedented offer by the teetering regime of a seat around the negotiation table, it joined in when others — include all the Tahrir groups and ElBaradei's National Association for Change — refused. I don't agree with some people's view that the new Egyptian political reality irrelevant, but like other opposition groups it will have to account — internally and to the public — for its initial hesitation. Personally, there is little doubt in my mind that the MB leadership would have cut a deal with the regime if it thought it could get away with it.
That being said, the issue of the Brotherhood is important for Egypt's future, and there is plenty for some people to be concerned about. The MB is quite well placed to take advantage of a political opening in Egypt, with its track record at electoral canvassing, a decent national organization with a robust administrative framework, a well-known message and many reputable personalities. As Helena Cobban notes, it is also perhaps the political force in Egypt with the best PR, domestically and internationally, having placed two op-eds into the major American papers today:
- Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh - Democracy supporters should not fear the Muslim Brotherhood
- What the Muslim Brothers Want - Essam al-Erian - NYTimes.com
PR is not everything, though. These two men, al-Erian and Abou el-Fotouh, are the image the MB wants to give to the outside world: accomplished professionals, great syndicate organizers, and people who describe themselves as "reformists." In Abou el-Fotouh's case, he deserves this accolade — he has a track record of intellectual integrity and openness. But he could not keep himself on the Guidance Council in the last elections, which tells you a lot about his position within the MB. Al-Erian, after years of being ignored because a) he speaks too much and b) he wanted it too much, was elected to the Guidance Council in what appeared to be a deal with the conservative leadership. Al-Erian is a great political operative, but one whose values are flexible to say the least. Having interviewed him many times, I have often wonders whether he believes in what he says and how much it is shared by others in the MB.
The MB is a big tent, it includes people with a lot of different views. The whole sad episode of its draft program a few years ago showed that there are strong disagreements within the organization on doctrine, and in the last two years a growing disagreement on methods, notably whether it was worth paying the price of political participation when the movement's core aim is the Islamization of society from below. Its swing back in an ultra-conservative direction after the opening that took place under the innovative if haphazard leadership of General Guide Muhammad Akef was largely a reaction, and perhaps a concession, to the regime. The Egyptian revolution that has just taken place will also have an impact on leadership and rank-and-file, particularly since they have a shot at their political activity being legitimized and legalized for the first time.
But that does not mean it will be easily able to resolve the debates that have raged over the last few years. In my opinion, the MB should be made to register as a civil society group and provide information as to its financing. Should — as I hope — partisan life in Egypt be reformed and the obstacles to political party formation removed, its political wing will be able to form a party. Hopefully they might form several parties, with perhaps some joining forces with the Wasat movement and others forming a more conservative party. Likewise reformed Gamaa Islamiya members will be able to form a party, or perhaps join other formations. That's assuming — and it's a big if at this point — that the ban on religious parties the regime had imposed is lifted. Most likely, some sort of compromise will be found: a new national consensus that can leave room for Islamist politicians and also address the quite understandable fears many have about Islamists reaching power. I also hope that part of this trade-off is a secular constitution, although that's unlikely. A lot will depend on the new red lines that emerge from the army, and the extent to which the transition process progresses smoothly.
As it stands, the Muslim Brotherhood is one of the most intellectually un-evolved major Islamist movements in the Arab world. Practically everyone of its offshoots has devised mechanisms for separating proselytization and politics, and has had the opportunity of having a richer intellectual debate about it means to be an Islamists in the 21st century. The MB, like most opposition groups in Egypt, took on some of the attributes of the regime: sclerosis, gerontocracy, authoritarian tendencies, lack of vision, and more. They were taken by surprise by Kifaya in 2005 and by the revolt in 2011. Their major advance in recent years was their public attachment to democracy and pluralism, but that was when it seemed like a distant possibility. They now need to reassess and more clearly communicate what they stand for in post-25 January Egypt. There will have to be a lot of house-cleaning.
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Palash Biswas
Pl Read:
http://nandigramunited-banga.blogspot.com/
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